Regional allies and partners of both Japan and China face difficult balancing acts during the current crisis, attempting to maintain relationships with both countries while avoiding actions that might be interpreted as taking sides in disputes over Taiwan and broader bilateral tensions. South Korea, Southeast Asian nations, and others with significant economic and security relationships with both countries must navigate complex dynamics where their choices regarding the crisis affect their own bilateral relationships with the disputants.
For South Korea, the challenge is particularly acute given security alliance with the United States, significant economic ties with China, and complex historical relationships with Japan. The current crisis where Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Taiwan statements triggered Chinese economic pressure creates pressures for South Korea to signal positions, yet any clear stance risks damaging relationships with whichever side perceives insufficient support. South Korea benefits economically from Chinese tourism redirected away from Japan but cannot appear to capitalize too obviously on bilateral tensions without risking its own relationships.
Southeast Asian nations face similar dilemmas, particularly those belonging to ASEAN who maintain carefully balanced relationships with both major powers. The crisis demonstrates how bilateral disputes between Japan and China create regional ripple effects that force third parties into uncomfortable positions. These countries depend on economic relationships with China while valuing security cooperation with Japan and shared concerns about regional stability, creating conflicting pressures when bilateral tensions force choices about which relationships to prioritize.
The regional balancing acts are complicated by the Taiwan dimension of the current crisis. Countries must consider not just bilateral Japan-China relations but also their own positions regarding Taiwan and broader questions about cross-strait stability. Supporting Japanese positions might be interpreted as taking stances on Taiwan that could damage relationships with Beijing, while supporting Chinese positions might be seen as endorsing economic coercion tactics that could be used against themselves in future disputes.
The inability of regional partners to facilitate crisis resolution reflects these difficult balancing acts. Third parties that might otherwise mediate bilateral disputes are constrained by concerns about how their involvement would affect their own relationships with both disputants. The result is relative isolation of the bilateral dispute without effective regional crisis management mechanisms, leaving the confrontation to proceed according to power dynamics between Japan and China without moderating influences from regional partners.
The tourism sector illustrates these regional dynamics concretely. Chinese visitors redirected from Japan may benefit South Korean or Southeast Asian tourism operators, creating economic incentives for countries to remain neutral or even quietly welcome bilateral tensions that redirect Chinese spending toward their own economies. While economist Takahide Kiuchi projects $11.5 billion in Japanese tourism losses from over 8 million Chinese visitors representing 23% of all arrivals, this represents potential gains for competitors who cannot appear too eager to capitalize on bilateral tensions. Professor Liu Jiangyong indicates countermeasures will be rolled out gradually while Sheila A. Smith notes domestic political constraints make compromise difficult, with regional allies unable to effectively facilitate resolution due to their own complex balancing requirements that prevent active engagement in bilateral crisis management that might damage their carefully maintained relationships with both major powers.
